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Abstract

Fifty-eight percent of the workers enrolled in the Illinois Claimant
Bonus experiment were eligible for 38 weeks of Unemployment Insurance (UI)
benefits--26 weeks of state-regular benefits plus 12 weeks of Federal
Supplemental Compensation (FSC).

The other 42 percent were eligible for

only 26 weeks of state-regular UI benefits.

We find that the Claimant Bonus

treatment--an offer of $500 in cash for rapid reemployment--reduced the
duration of insured unemployment by about 1.8 weeks for workers who were
eligible for 38 weeks of UI benefits, but by only about 0.75 week for the
workers who were eligible for 26 weeks of UI.

We specify a search/matching

model for each of the two groups (FSC-eligible and -ineligible) and find
that (a) the model predicts a far larger bonus impact for workers eligible
for 38 weeks of benefits than for those eligible for 26 weeks, and (b) the
model's quantitative predictions cannot be rejected by the data.
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or, Why the Illinois Experiment Worked
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The basic result of the Illinois Claimant Bonus experiment was striking
and strong:

A $500 cash bonus offered to insured unemployed workers for

gaining reemployment within 11 weeks of filing for Unemployment Insurance
(UI) benefits reduced the duration of insured unemployment by over 1 week on
average (Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987).

Although apparently consistent with

the results of the New Jersey UI Reemployment Demonstration Project (Corson,
Dunstan, Decker, and Gordon 1989), the Illinois Claimant Bonus effect is
"too strong" in two senses:

First, at least three well-executed

investigations have been unable to explain the result using various economic
models of worker behavior (Meyer 1988; Levine 1988, 1989).

And second, the

Washington Reemployment Bonus experiment (Spiegelman, O'Leary, and Kline
1990) seems to have obtained significantly smaller bonus impacts than were
observed in the Illinois experiment.
In this paper, we offer a possible explanation of the large effect of
the Illinois Claimant Bonus.

In section I, we show that over half of the

workers enrolled in the Illinois Claimant Bonus experiment were eligible for
a total of 38 weeks of Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits--26 weeks of
state-regular benefits plus 12 weeks of Federal Supplemental Compensation
(FSC).

The other workers were eligible for just 26 weeks of state-regular

benefits.

We find that the Claimant Bonus effect was much larger for the

FSC-eligible workers than for the workers who were eligible for only state-

regular benefits.

In section II, we develop a search/matching model that is

tailored to the Illinois Claimant Bonus experiment, and show that the
predicted effect of the Claimant Bonus is much greater for workers eligible
for 38 weeks of UI than for workers eligible for just 26 weeks.

Moreover,

we find that the quantitative implications of the model cannot be rejected
by the experiment's outcomes.

I.

Effects of the Illinois Claimant Bonus under Different
Potential Benefit Durations

Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC) was a temporary extended UI
benefit program that existed between 1982 and 1985 (Corson, Grossman, and
Nicholson 1986).

In Illinois, FSC entitled most UI beneficiaries to 12

weeks of extended benefits in addition to their 26 weeks of state regular
benefits.

Because FSC expired about halfway into the enrollment period of

the Illinois Claimant Bonus experiment, we have a natural experiment
embedded in the controlled Claimant Bonus experiment that was implemented by
the Illinois Department of Employment Security and the W.E. Upjohn
Institute.

That is, because of FSC's expiration, some of the workers who

were eligible to participate in the experiment had a potential benefit
duration of 38 weeks (26 weeks of state-regular benefits plus 12 weeks of
FSC), whereas others had potential benefit duration of just 26 weeks.
exploit the consequences of that natural experiment in this section.
Table 1 displays the number of workers enrolled in the Illinois
Claimant Bonus experimental and control groups, broken down by FSC
eligibility.

The monetary eligibility requirements for FSC were more

We

stringent than for state regular benefits; hence, not all claimants whose
work histories were sufficient to make them eligible for state regular
benefits were also eligible for FSC.

We have excluded from our sample of

FSC-ineligibles workers who would have been ineligible for FSC even if they
had filed their claim before FSC expired: that is, all claimants whose work
histories would have made them ineligible for FSC are excluded from our
sample.

o

As will be seen below (Table 2), this makes FSC-eligibles and

ineligibles reasonably comparable without additional controls.

Differences

between the FSC-eligibles and -ineligibles we examine should result only
from the fact that the eligibles filed before the FSC cutoff date.
The bottom row of Table 1 shows that 57 percent of the control group
(2337 out of 3706) and nearly 60 percent of the Claimant Experiment group
(2337 out of 3926) were eligible for FSC.

Although these percentages are

similar, the difference between them (nearly 3 percentage points) has a pvalue of 1.7 percent, suggesting that a higher percentage of experimentals
than controls were eligible for FSC.

In view of the design and operations

of the experiment, it is unclear why this should be the case.
Table 1 also shows the program participation of FSC-eligibles (Panel A)
and -ineligibles (Panel B).

FSC-eligibles were more likely to participate

in and use the Claimant Experiment than were FSC-ineligibles.

Whereas 20

percent of FSC-eligibles submitted a Notice of Hire and 16 percent actually
received a bonus, only 15 percent of the FSC-ineligibles submitted a Notice
of Hire and 12 percent received a bonus.

(Both of these differences between

FSC-eligibles and -ineligibles have p-values of less than 1 percent.)
is the first piece of evidence suggesting that the Claimant Bonus had a
greater impact on workers with longer benefit entitlement.

This

Our goal is to estimate the impact of the bonus offer and of
FSC-eligibility on the duration of unemployment.

Since workers were

randomly assigned to the Claimant Bonus treatment, and since eligibility for
FSC depends in our sample only on when a worker filed for benefits (before
or after expiration of the FSC program), it may be reasonable to draw
inferences from unadjusted pairwise comparisons between various subgroups.
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of four subsamples of
experimental enrollees:

FSC-eligible controls, FSC-eligible experimentals,

FSC-ineligible controls, FSC-ineligible experimentals.

Comparing the FSC-

eligible controls with the FSC-eligible experimentals, it seems that a
higher proportion of experimentals were white, but there "are no other
observable differences between controls and experimentals that have p-values
as high as 5 percent.

Comparison of FSC-Ineligible controls and

experimentals suggests that a higher proportion of controls were women and
filed for benefits in the Chicago area.

Otherwise, these controls and

experimentals are observationally quite similar.

Finally, comparison of

FSC-eligible controls with FSC-ineligible controls suggests that these two
groups are quite similar, with the only difference being that the FSCeligible controls were slightly older.
Although there are some observable differences among the four
subsamples shown in Table 2, there is some support for the claim that the
newly unemployed workers whose characteristics are summarized in the table
were randomly distributed across the four groups.

Accordingly, in section

I.A below, we present unadjusted pairwise comparisons between groups,
without additional controls.

Although we believe that these unadjusted

comparisons are worth presenting, the observable differences between the
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groups suggest the need for comparisons that do control for observable
characteristics.

A.

Such adjusted comparisons are presented in section I.E.

Unadjusted Experimental Comparisons

1.

Basic Results.

Table 3 displays means (and differences of means)

of a variety of program variables for each of the four groups.

Consider the

differences between the experimental and control groups, for FSC-eligibles
(column 3) and FSC-ineligibles (column 6).
be inferred from these figures.

There are three main points to

First, workers assigned to the Claimant

Experiment who were eligible for FSC received $223 less in state regular UI
benefits than did controls over the full benefit year (the p-value of this
difference is far less than 1 percent) , but the experimentals who were
ineligible for FSC received only $94 less, and this latter difference has a
p-value of nearly 11 percent (see row 3, columns 3 and 6).

That is,

although the bonus offer resulted in a large drop in benefits received by
FSC-eligibles, the evidence is at best weak that the bonus reduced the
benefits paid to FSC-ineligibles.
Second, as can be seen in Table 3, row 6, workers in the Claimant
Experiment who were eligible for FSC experienced nearly 1.8 fewer weeks of
insured unemployment than did controls over the full benefit year (the pvalue of this difference is far less than 1 percent).

But experimentals who

were _ineligible for FSC experienced only 0.7 fewer weeks of insured
unemployment (the p-value of this difference is 3.5 percent).
Third, the contrast between FSC-eligibles and -ineligibles in their
response to the Claimant Experiment appears again in the proportion of

claimants who exhausted their benefits (Table 3, row 7).

Whereas FSC-

eligible experimentals were less likely than controls to exhaust their
benefits (by 5 percentage points, with a p-value far less than 1 percent),
there is little evidence that FSC-rneligible experimentals were less likely
to exhaust their benefits.
2.

Unadjusted Reemployment Hazards.

The data we are using are unusual

in allowing us to construct an accurate measure of when a UI recipient
became reemployed.

o

In Tables 4 and 5, we present unadjusted estimates of

the conditional probability of reemployment--or discrete reemployment
hazards

for each of the four groups.

These hazards, which are based on the

well-known Kaplan-Meier estimator, are descriptive in that they do not
adjust for observable differences among workers in the probability of
reemployment.
Because UI claimants in Illinois are certified for two weeks of
benefits at a time, we measure time in two-week intervals starting from the
time the initial claim was filed.

We compute the unadjusted reemployment

hazards in Tables 4 and 5 by dividing the number of workers who became
reemployed during two-week period t by the number of workers who were
unemployed at the beginning of period t.

This latter group--the so-called

risk set, or the number of workers "at risk" of reemployment--is shown in
the columns labelled Risk set, and the unadjusted reemployment probability
is shown in the columns labelled Hazard.
In constructing our reemployment variable we have assumed that all
workers were unemployed for at least one week (the waiting week).

Also,

workers who gained reemployment during the first week during which UI could
be collected are coded as reemployed during weeks 2 and 3.

Hence, the

reemployment hazard for FSC-eligible controls in the first period (weeks 0
and 1) is undefined, and 2,106 FSC-eligible controls were in the risk set at
Since 192 of these

the beginning of the second period (see Table 4).

workers were reemployed by the end of this second period (weeks 2 and 3),
the reemployment hazard for this period is 0.0912.
hazards are computed similarly.

Other reemployment

Note that the risk set in period t+1 does

not in general equal the risk set in period t minus the number of workers
who gained reemployment.

For example, the number of controls in the risk

set at the beginning of weeks 4 and 5 (1,910) is 4 less than 2,106 minus
192.

This occurs because 4 workers left the labor force (that is, stopped

searching for work and collecting UI benefits) during weeks 2 and 3.
Table 4 displays unadjusted reemployment hazards for FSC-eligible
workers (both controls and experimentals).
hazards is similar for the two groups:

The general time-pattern of the

Both hazard functions have an early

spike, then fall gradually to a flat segment with hazards in the
neighborhood of 0.03.

There is a spike when state-regular benefits are

exhausted, a return to a relatively low hazards during receipt of FSC, and
finally a large spike at the time of benefit exhaustion.

Note that there

are noticeable upturns in the hazards just preceding the exhaustion of both
state-regular benefits and FSC.
Although the hazards for the FSC-eligible control and experimental
groups are similar in a general way, closer comparison of the two hazard
functions shows some differences.

In five of the first six periods (that

is, the periods during which workers assigned to the experimental group
could receive a $500 bonus by gaining reemployment) the experimental
reemployment hazard exceeds the control hazard.

(In the four of these

cases, the p-value of the difference is less than 10 percent, and in three
cases the p-value is less than 5 percent.

In the case in which the control

group hazard exceeds the experimental hazard, the p-value is over 70
percent.)

After the bonus qualification period, the control and

experimental hazards are very similar, except in the period prior to benefit
exhaustion, when the control hazard exceeds the experimental hazard (the
difference between 0.043 and 0.023 has a p-value of 6 percent).
Table 5 gives unadjusted reemployment hazards for FSC-ineligible
workers.

Again, the general time-pattern of the hazards is similar for the

two groups, with both hazards showing an early spike followed by a flat
segment (with hazards around 0.04), an upturn just before benefit
exhaustion, and a large spike at the point of benefit exhaustion. But there
/
are also differences between the FSC-ineligible control and experimental
groups.

In three of the first six periods, the experimental reemployment

hazard exceeds the control hazard.
value is 5 percent or less.

(In the two of these periods, the p-

In none of the three periods in which the

control group hazard exceeds the experimental hazard is the p-value less
than 50 percent.)

After the bonus qualification period, the control and

experimental hazards are similar, except in weeks 22-23, when the control
hazard exceeds the experimental hazard (the difference has a p-value of 5
percent).
Finally, both Tables 4 and 5 show the expected duration of unemployment
that is implied by each of the four unadjusted hazard functions.

Table 4

shows that the expected duration for FSC-eligible controls was 25.8 weeks,
and for FSC-eligible experimentals was 24.1 weeks.

These estimated expected

durations of unemployment are both about 4 weeks greater than the directly

observed durations of insured unemployment shown in Table 3, row 6.

The

difference between the control and experimental expected durations, nearly
1.8 weeks, is very close to the difference between the control and
experimental insured unemployment durations.
Similarly, Table 5 shows that the expected duration of unemployment for
FSC-ineligible controls was 22.4 weeks, and for FSC-ineligible experimentals
was 21.6 weeks.

The difference, nearly 0.9 weeks, again accords well with

directly observed experimental effect on duration of insured unemployment
(0.7 weeks--see Table 3, row 6, column 6).
To summarize, the unadjusted estimates of the bonus impact suggest that
FSC-eligible workers responded more strongly to the bonus^ than did FSCineligible workers.

We defer to section III a fuller discussion of the

estimated differences between FSC-eligibles and -ineligibles in their
response to the Claimant Bonus.

B.

Adjusted Comparisons

The observable differences in characteristics among the four groups
that we are analyzing suggest the possible importance of adjusting
those differences.

for

In this section, we present the results of two adjusted

comparisons.
1.

Linear Model of Insured Unemployment Duration.

We first estimate a

linear model of the number of weeks of insured unemployment experienced by a
worker during the full benefit year.

Denoting the duration of insured

unemployment (in weeks) by DIU, a vector of control variables by x^^,

. . . ,

XK , and assignment to the Claimant Bonus experimental group by E, this model
can be written:
DIU = a 0 4- a. l yi l + . . . + aKxK + ak+1 E + u,

(1.1)

where u is assumed to be a normally distributed disturbance term.

The

pioneering studies of the impact of UI on unemployment duration took
essentially this approach (Ehrenberg and Oaxaca 1976; Holen 1977).
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 display estimates of such a model applied to
FSC-eligibles and -ineligibles.

Included in the model are controls for

gender, age, ethnicity, the number of employers for whom the claimant worked
in the base period, base period earnings, the number of referrals received
by the claimant from the Job Service, whether a dependents' allowance was
received, the weekly UI benefit amount, and the labor market in which the
claimant was searching for work.
The adjusted estimates of the Claimant Bonus's effects on insured
unemployment (Table 6, columns 1 and 2) are in keeping with the unadjusted
estimates discussed above (Table 3).

The coefficient of the Claimant Bonus

treatment variable suggests that the bonus offer reduced the number of weeks
of insured unemployment by about 1.7 weeks for FSC-eligibles, and by close
to 0.7 week for FSC-ineligibles.

Thus, introducing controls in a linear OLS

framework suggests that the unadjusted comparisons of insured unemployment
discussed in section l.A are unbiased.
2.

Discrete-Time Reemployment Hazard Model.

A limitation of the

unadjusted reemployment probabilities displayed in Tables 4 and 5 is that
they fail to control for observable heterogeneity in the sample of workers
analyzed.

As an alternative, suppose that the reemployment hazard in period

t following the initial claim for UI (mt ) depends on the same control
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variables (X I ,...,XK ) that were included in the linear model (these do not
vary over time), the season in which a worker is searching (s, which does
vary over time) and the elapsed time since the worker filed his or her
initial UI claim (t):
mt = mt (x 1 ,..., XK , s, t).

(1.2)

This contrasts with the unadjusted reemployment hazards of Tables 4 and 5,
which depend only on t.
We specify equation (1.2) as a discrete-time hazard model similar to
those estimated by Nickell (1979), Ham and Rea (1987), and Steinberg and
Specifically, we assume the existence of an underlying

Monforte (1987).

A-

indicator variable, mti , for worker i in time period t following his or her
initial claim, defined by:
/ 1

"
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where the a, /?, and 7 are coefficients to be estimated, s l through S A are
dummy variables specifying the season, t x through t 15 are dummy variables
specifying time since the initial claim, and uti is a disturbance term
(assumed to have the standard normal distribution and to be independent of
other uti ).
of mti :

We do not observe mti ; rather, we observe binary realizations

1 if mti > 0, zero otherwise.

Censoring is a problem that arises invariably with data of this kind.
Although we observe 60 percent of the workers in our sample gaining
reemployment, the other 40 percent either dropped out of the labor force or
gained reemployment after the data available to us were collected.

We

observe a censored or incomplete spell of joblessness for these latter
workers.

Suppose there are I completed spells of joblessness in the sample
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(indexed by i), and denote the probability of a completed spell of
joblessness as gi (x11 ,..., xKi , s x , t i ).

Further, suppose there are J

censored spells of joblessness in the sample (indexed by j), and denote the
probability of a censored spell of joblessness as [1 s ' *- )J

(1.4)

G^XJJ

,..., xKj ,

^e can tnen write the likelihood function for our sample as.

£ =

j
i
E gi( Xli , .... xKi , s if tj n [1 - GjCXu
j=i
1=1

,..., xKj , Sj , t j ) ] .

Given our assumptions about the functional form and disturbance term in
(1.3), this likelihood function can be maximized by applying probit to a
data set in which the unit of observation is the claimant-time period
(rather than the claimant, as in the linear model).

o

Note that using a set of time-since-initial-claim dummy variables
allows us to estimate a flexible relationship between the conditional
reemployment probability and the time since filing the initial claim.

No

assumption is imposed on the shape of the hazard function or the
distribution of reemployment probabilities.

Note also that under this

specification, each worker in the sample has a reemployment probability
based on his or her characteristics (xx ,..., XK ), and this probability
changes during the spell of unemployment according to the season in which he
or she is searching and the length of time since filing the initial claim.
The model we estimate shares this feature with the well-known proportional
hazards model of Cox (1972), and is in fact a discrete version of that model
(Allison 1984).
The results of estimating four discrete-time hazard models are
displayed in Table 6, columns (3) through (6).
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We specify separate models

for FSC-eligible controls, FSC-eligible experimentals, FSC-ineligible
controls, and FSC-ineligible experimentals in order to allow the hazard
function for each group to be estimated without coefficient restrictions.
Although the hazard functions that derive from these estimates are of
central interest, we consider first the coefficient estimates of the
demographic and other variables in the model.
Older workers in all four groups have lower probabilities of
reemployment in any given period than do younger workers, reflecting greater
difficulty in matching workers to jobs when workers have more specific human
capital.

Although there is no clear difference between men and women in

reemployment probabilities, blacks and Hispanics have a significantly lower
probability of reemployment.

This finding is consistent with discrimination

against blacks in hiring.
Workers who had higher earnings in the base period were somewhat more
likely to be reemployed quickly.

This is consistent with the idea that

high-wage workers have a higher opportunity cost of remaining unemployed,
and hence search with greater effort.

Once base period earnings are

controlled for, the weekly UI benefit amount has no important impact on
reemployment probabilities in these data.
Workers who filed for UI benefits in more favorable labor markets--that
is, labor markets in which unemployment was low or rapidly falling--had
significantly higher reemployment probabilities than did workers who were
searching in slacker labor markets.

This is consistent with the model we

develop below, in which the existence of more job vacancies leads to a
higher reemployment probability.
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Finally, there is little evidence of any seasonality in the probability
of reemployment.

Although FSC-eligible controls had a lower reemployment

probability when searching during the winter than during the summer, no
other seasonality coefficient has a p-value as low as 5 percent.
The main point of obtaining the hazard estimates in columns (3) through
(6) of Table 6 is to generate adjusted reemployment hazard functions for
each of the four groups.
displayed in Table 7.

The hazard functions implied by the estimates are

These conditional reemployment probabilities are

obtained by substituting the mean characteristics of each duration cohort
into the appropriate model and solving for the expected probability of
reemployment.

For example, the expected reemployment probability for FSC-

eligible controls during weeks 6 and 7 (0.0434) is obtained by substituting
the mean characteristics of FSC-eligible controls who were available for
reemployment at the beginning of weeks 6 and 7 into the control group model
(Table 6, column (3)), adding the time-since-initial-claim coefficient for
weeks 6 and 7, and solving.
The most striking feature of Table 7 is the similarity of the adjusted
hazards shown there to the unadjusted hazards shown in Tables 4 and 5.

In

fact, the patterns are so similar that the discussions of the unadjusted
hazards that we offered in section I.A.2 apply equally here.

Given the

similarity of the adjusted and unadjusted hazards, it is not surprising that
the implied expected durations of unemployment shown in the bottom row of
Table 7 are nearly identical to those shown in Tables 4 and 5.

Those

expected duration estimates suggest a bonus impact of 1.76 weeks (25.86 24.10) for FSC-eligibles, but of only 0.88 week (22.43 - 21.56) for FSCineligibles.

As we discuss in section III, the difference between FSC-
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eligibles and -ineligibles in their response to the Claimant Bonus (roughly
0.9 week greater for FSC-eligibles) has a p-value of about 6.5 percent (that
is, a test for equality of responses would be rejected at the 6.5-percent
significance level).

II. An Equilibrium Model of the Reemployment Bonus

The evidence suggests that the effect of the Illinois Claimant Bonus
was greater for FSC-eligible workers (who were eligible for 38 weeks of UI
benefits) than for FSC-ineligible workers (who were eligible for only 26
weeks).

Our goal in this section is to develop a model that yields insight

into why this should be true.

Recall that the Illinois Claimant Bonus

offered to pay $500 to recipients of Unemployment Insurance (UI) who found a
job during the first eleven weeks after filing for UI.

These workers were

also eligible for either 38 or 26 weeks of UI (following a waiting week).
For the purposes of modeling the bonus program, then, we divide unemployed
workers into three groups:

those offered the bonus and eligible for UI;

those no longer offered the bonus but still eligible for UI; and those
neither offered the bonus nor eligible for UI.

We first set out a model in

which bonus-offered workers are eligible for 26 weeks of UI benefits, then
indicate the straightforward changes that are needed to generate the model
in which workers are eligible for 38 weeks of UI benefits.
To investigate the impact of the bonus program on the expected duration
of unemployment, we adopt an equilibrium model in which it takes time and
effort for firms with vacancies and unemployed workers to find each other
(thus, unemployment is frictional).

Jobless workers can reduce the time it
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takes to find employment by searching with greater effort, although
increasing search effort is costly.

In conjunction with the assumed

matching technology, workers' search efforts determine the rate at which new
jobs are created.

To obtain a model with an equilibrium level of

unemployment, it is necessary to assume that jobs do not last forever.

We

therefore assume that in each period some jobs dissolve, creating
unemployment.
are equal.

In equilibrium, the rate of job creation and job dissolution

Our model therefore combines elements of the job search and

matching literatures.

However, as we describe below, our model differs from

much of the work on matching by assuming that all firms pay the same wage
and all workers are equally productive. "

A.

The Model

The model is explained in three stages.

First, we discuss the steady-

state conditions, which describe the dynamics of the labor market, including
the manner in which jobs are created and destroyed.

These conditions

guarantee that the flows into and out of employment are equal (so that we
have an equilibrium).

Second, we develop the matching technology.

Third,

we solve the problem of a typical unemployed worker who must choose search
effort to maximize expected lifetime utility.

To do so, we must first

derive the expected utility of workers who are employed and the expected
utility for jobless workers.

Search effort is then chosen to maximize the

expected lifetime income of unemployed workers.
1.

Steady State Conditions.

Let J denote the steady state number of
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Then, by

jobs held in the economy, and V the number of vacancies.
definition, F denotes full employment where

(2.1)

F = J + V.

We also interpret F as the number of firms in the economy.

This is

equivalent to an assumption that each firm employs at most one worker (i.e.,
there is no distinction between a firm and a vacancy) .

This modelling

abstraction is used to keep the analysis as simple as possible. *We measure time in two-week intervals since, again, insured unemployed
workers in Illinois are certified for two weeks of UI benefits at a time.
With this in mind, let L denote the total number of workers in the labor
force (employed and unemployed); Ut , the number of unemployed workers who
are in their tth two-week period of search where t < 14 (these workers are
eligible for state-regular UI benefits); and Un , the number of workers who
have been unemployed for more than 14 periods (or twenty-eight weeks; i.e.,
they have exhausted their UI benefits) .

Then the number of workers eligible

14

for UI at any point in time is £ Ut while Un represents the number of
t=i
ineligible workers. Since all workers are either employed or unemployed, it
follows that:

14

(2.2)

L - J + £ Ut + Un .
t=i

Equations (2.1) and (2.2) are simple accounting identities.

We now

turn to a description of the evolution of the labor market over time.
There are 15 employment states: employment (state J), insured unemployment
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(one state each for Ut with t < 14) and unemployment after UI benefits are
exhausted (state Un ) .

Movements into and out of these states depend on the

rates at which jobs are found and destroyed.

Let mt denote the probability

that an insured unemployed worker who is in the tth period of search finds
employment and let n^ play the same role for unemployed workers who have
exhausted their UI benefits.

Note that mt and n^ are reemployment hazards.

We use a to denote the separation (or "break-up") rate.

That is, a

represents the probability that a job will dissolve during any two-week
period.

The determination of mt , n^ , and a will be discussed in detail

below but, for now, they will be treated as parameters.
The evolution of the labor market is depicted in Figure 1.
first the flows into each state of unemployment.
are J employed workers.

In any given period there

At the end of the period, oJ of these workers lose

their jobs and must reenter the search process.
retain their jobs and remain in state J.
aJ.

Consider

The remainder, (l-a)J,

Thus, the flow into state Uj^ is

Workers enter state Ut (with t < 14) if and only if they were in their

(t-l) st period of search in the previous period and failed to find a job.
Thus, the flow into state Ut is (l-m^^Ut...!.

Finally, workers exhaust

their UI benefits if they fail to find employment in their twenty-seventh
week of search.

The flow into Un is therefore equal to (l-m1A )U1/( .

The flows out of each state are even easier to characterize.

In each

period, successful searchers in state Ut find employment and enter state J
while unsuccessful ones move on to state Ut+1 .
workers flow out of their current state.
Ut is simply Ut .

Thus, all insured unemployed

This implies that the flow out of

Unemployed workers who have exhausted their UI benefits
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leave their state only when they find employment.

Thus the flow out of Un

is equal to n^l^ .
In a steady-state equilibrium the flows into and out of each employment
state must be equal so that the unemployment rate and the composition of the
unemployment pool (i.e., the distribution of Ut ) do not vary over time.
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Equating these flows yields the following steady-state conditions.-^

(2.3)

(2.4)

(l-int-i)^ = Ut

for t = 2 , . . . , 14

(2.5)

If (2. 3) -(2. 5) hold then J, Ut , and Un will not vary over time.
2. Matching Technology.

The reemployment probabilities (or hazards),

m^ and n^ , depend on the matching process and level of search effort
expended by unemployed workers.

In each period, unemployed workers choose

their level of search effort to maximize expected lifetime income.

This

search effort determines the probability that the worker contacts a firm and
applies for a job (search effort may be fruitless) .

The firm hires the

worker at a wage of w if it has a vacancy and if no other applications are
-1 O

made. J

If more than one workers applies, the firm chooses randomly among

all applicants.

A worker's reemployment probability therefore depends on

the probability of contacting a firm, the probability that the contacted
firm has a vacancy, and the probability of getting the job over all other
applicants .
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Formally, let pt denote the probability that, in any given period, an
eligible worker who has been unemployed for t two-week periods contacts a
firm (pn plays the same role for workers who have exhausted benefits).

This

variable measures search effort since it can be increased only by searching
with greater effort.

The determination of pt is discussed in the next sub

section; for now, we treat it as a parameter.

Once a firm has been

contacted, the probability that this randomly chosen firm has a vacancy is
V/F.

Finally, if the firm does have a vacancy, the probability of landing

the job is 1/(N+1) where N denotes the number of other applications made.
Since each other worker either does or does not apply to the firm in
question, N is a random variable distributed Poisson with parameter A
(defined as the average number of applications across firms).

Thus, the

probability that applicant i gets the job, given that N other applications
have been filed, is:

N=0

The product of these three probabilities yields the reemployment hazard for
each worker:^

(2.6)

mt = (p t /A)(V/F)[l-e- A ]

(2.7)

n^ = ( Pn /A)(V/F)[l-e- A ]

for t = 1,...,14

with
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(2.8)

A = <1/F){£ Pt U t + Pn Un ).
t=i

3.

Search Effort.

lifetime income.

Search effort is chosen to maximize expected

It is clear from (2.6) and (2.7) that by searching harder

an unemployed worker can increase the probability of reemployment .
course, there is a cost associated with increased search effort.

Of
The

optimal search effort results from equating the expected marginal benefit
from an increase in search effort with its marginal cost.
Let Vt denote the expected lifetime income for an insured unemployed
worker currently in the tth period of search (Vn plays the same role for
workers who have exhausted benefits).

In addition, let~V-e represent the

expected lifetime income for a worker who is currently employed.

Then, if

we assume that search costs are quadratic, Vt , Vn , and Ve satisfy:

(2.9)

Vt - y - cp? + [l/d+OHmJV. + b) + (l-mt )Vt+1 )

(2.10) Vt = y - cp? + [l/(l+r)]{mt Ve + (l-mt )Vt+1 )

(2.11)

V 1A = y - cpf, + [l/(l+r)]{m14 Ve + (l-m14 )Vn >

(2.12)

Vn = cp2 + [l/(l,+r)]{nin Ve + (l-mn )Vn )

(2.13)

Ve = w + [l/d+r)]^ + (l-a)Ve )

for t - 1,...,6

for t = 7.....13

where y denotes UI benefits, b represents the bonus paid to workers
qualified for it, and r is the bi-weekly interest rate.
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Equation (2.9)

states that an unemployed worker who was offered the bonus currently
collects UI benefits (y) and pays out search costs (cp£).

With probability

mt search is successful and the worker receives a bonus of b and begins
working (so that expected lifetime income increases to Ve ).

With

probability (l-mt ) search is unsuccessful and the worker continues to search
in the next period (so that expected lifetime income becomes Vt+1 ).

These

last two terras are discounted since they reflect income received in the next
period.

Equation (2.10) is the analogous condition for a worker who is

still eligible for UI but is no longer offered the bonus while (2.11) is the
appropriate expression for a worker about to exhaust UI benefits.

Note that

when a worker who is not offered the bonus finds a job no bonus is
collected.

Finally, (2.12) describes the situation faced by a worker who

has exhausted UI benefits and (2.13) describes expected income for an
employed worker.

For the employed, current income is w but, with

probability a the worker becomes unemployed and must begin searching for a
new job (so that expected income drops to V^.

With probability (1-a) the

worker remains employed and continues to earn Ve .
Each unemployed worker chooses p, the contact probability, to maximize
expected lifetime income.
effort.

*

Therefore, p t can be interpreted as search

Maximizing each expression yields the following optimal levels of

search effort (recall that the m's are functions of the p's through (2.6)
and (2.7)): 16

(2.14)

Pt

- {{mt /[2c(l+r)])[Ve + b - Vt+1 ]}*

f or t - 1, . . . , 6

(2.15)

pt

= {{mt /[2c(l+r)]}[Ve - Vt+1 ]p

for t = 7,....13
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(2.16)

Pl4 - {{m1A /[2c(l+r)]}[Ve - Vn ]>*

(2.17)

Pn

= {{mn /[2c(l+r)]}[Ve - Vn ]>*

To summarize, in each period unemployed workers choose search effort (as
measured by pt , the contact probability) to maximize expected lifetime
income.

The optimal values for search effort are given by (2.14)-(2.17).

These contact probabilities then determine the average number of
applications filed at each firm (A as given in (2.8)) and the reemployment
probabilities (as given in (2.6) and (2.7)).

Jobs are created as unemployed

workers find firms with vacancies and production takes place.

Finally, at

the end of the period, a fraction a of all jobs break-up and the newly
unemployed workers start searching for new jobs.

The steady-state

conditions (2.3)-(2.5) guarantee that the flows into and out of each
employment state are balanced so that the unemployment rate and the
composition of the unemployment pool are time invariant.
The model consists of sixty-four equations (one each in (2.1) - (2.3),
(2.5), (2.7), (2.8), (2.11) - (2.13), (2.16), and (2.17); thirteen in (2.4);
fourteen in (2.6); six each in (2.9) and (2.14); and seven in (2.10) and
(2.15)), in sixty-four unknowns (J, V, Ut for t < 14, Un , mt for t < 14, n^ ,
p t for t < 14, pn , A, V t for t < 14, Vt , and V e ) and seven parameters (F, L,
a, c, y, w, and r).

Once the model has been solved, the expected duration

of unemployment (d) can be calculated as:

(2.18)

d - 2 X ft t
t=i
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where

(2.19)

ft = (l-mi)(l-m2 ) ... (1-m^) (mt ) .

Equation (2.19) gives the unconditional probability of experiencing t twoweek periods of unemployment (calculated as the product of the probabilities
of not finding a job in each of the first t-1 periods, times n^ , the
conditional probability of finding a job in period t).

The model can be extended to allow for 38 weeks of UI eligibility by
letting t run from 1 to 20 in equations (2.2), (2.4), (2.6), (2.8), (2.10),
and (2.15), and by substituting U20 for U1A in (2.5), (2.11) and (2.16).

B.

Impact of the Bonus

To obtain the predicted impact of the Claimant Bonus we solve the model
for b = 0 and 500, and then compare the implied expected durations of
unemployment with and without the bonus.

We do this for both the model in

which workers are eligible for 38 weeks of UI benefits and for the model in
which workers are eligible for 26 weeks of benefits.
1.

Calibration and Solution.

In order to solve the model, we need

estimates of the parameters involved.

Because full employment (F) and the

cost parameter (c) are not observable, we proceed in two steps.

First, we

use data from before the Claimant Bonus experiment occurred to infer values
for F and c.

We then fix these values and solve the model with b = 500 to

determine the impact of the bonus offer.

24

To infer values for F and c we adopt the following procedure.
we note that the model is homogeneous of degree zero in F and L.

First,
Fixing L

at 100 and allowing F to vary, we have found that for values of F ranging
from 99 to 101, the model predicts an equilibrium unemployment rate in the
range of 5% to 12%, which seems appropriate given the time period in which
the experiment was conducted.

We have carried out the analysis for values

of F falling in this range and found that our results are robust with
respect to variations in F (Davidson and Woodbury 1990).
Next, we obtain values for y, w, and d from data gathered to evaluate
the experiment.

We then choose appropriate ranges of values for a and r,

relying on the literature for guidance.

By treating d as a parameter, we

are able to add equation (2.18) to the model and solve it treating c as
endogenous.

For each pair (a,r), this gives us a value for c that is

consistent with the data.
The average UI benefit for workers in our sample (for two weeks, and
including the dependents' allowance) was $280 during the experiment.

(The

figure is virtually the same for all four groups we are considering--FSCeligibles and -ineligibles, controls and experimentals--as can be seen in
Table 1.)

The average earnings (again for two weeks) of workers in our

sample who gained reemployment was $490.

The expected duration of

unemployment for FSC-eligible controls was 25.86 weeks, and for FSCineligible controls was 22.43 weeks (Table 7).

In all of the results

reported below, we have set L = F = 100, y = 280, w = 490, and d = 25.86
(for FSC-eligibles) or d = 22.43 (for FSC-ineligibles).

Also, since we must

start by focusing on the labor market in the absence of the bonus, we set b
= 0.
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For values of a, the bi-weekly break-up rate, and r, the bi-weekly
discount rate, we turn to the literature.

Papers by Murphy and Topel

(1987), Ehrenberg (1980) and Clark and Summers (1982) suggest that s for a
two-week period falls somewhere in the range of .006 to .014 (the mean
appears to be about .01).

We therefore focus on the case s = .01, but also

show that similar results are obtained when s = 0.006 and 0.014.
consider values of 0.002, 0.008, and 0.02.

For r we

This translates into annual

discount rates ranging from about 5% to 67% and therefore should include
most relevant values.

While the value of c is sometimes sensitive to the

values chosen for a and r, our overall results concerning expected duration
of unemployment are remarkably robust.
Calibrating the model in the manner described above allows us to obtain
values of c for various combinations of a and,r.

The next step is to use

each value of c to examine the impact of the bonus offer.
continue to assume that L = F = 100, y = 280, and w = 490.
set b

500.

To do so, we
Now, however, we

We then choose values for s and r and set c accordingly.

The

model can then be solved for all endogenous variables including the expected
duration of unemployment (d).
2.

Results.

Solving the model both with and without the bonus offer

yields the predicted effect of the bonus on the expected duration of
unemployment.

The predicted bonus effects under the values of s and r that

we have chosen are reported in Table 8.

For FSC-eligible workers, we find

that the model predicts reductions in expected unemployment of between 1.08
and 1.43 weeks.

In contrast, for FSC-ineligible workers, the model predicts

reductions of only 0.29 to 0.43 week.
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The effect of the Claimant Bonus is larger when potential benefit
duration is longer for reasons that can be seen in Figure 2, which shows the
level of search effort predicted by our model for each of the four groups we
are examining.

(The results shown are from models in which s = 0.01, r =

0.008, and in which we have held search cost equal for all groups so that
comparing search effort across groups is meaningful.)
Note first that, as expected, search effort is lower for FSC-eligibles
than for FSC-ineligibles throughout the period of UI eligibility.

Second,

note that the bonus offer immediately increases the search effort of bonus offered workers, because the offer increases the expected return to search.
The size of the bonus impact is related to the number of-weeks the worker
has been unemployed, with newly unemployed workers responding less than
those about to lose their chance to qualify for the bonus.

This occurs

because newly unemployed workers face a longer time horizon over which to
search and (possibly) qualify for the bonus.

As the end of the

qualification period draws nearer, workers respond with greater search
effort.
Third, the absolute increase in search effort induced by the bonus
offer is similar for both FSC-eligibles and -ineligibles, which implies a
greater proportional increase in the search effort of FSC-eligibles.

That

is, FSC-eligible workers who have a chance to get the bonus increase their
search intensities relatively more than do bonus-offered FSC-ineligibles.
It follows that the bonus offer should have a greater impact on workers who
are eligible for more weeks of UI benefits.
Table 8 showed this greater impact on the expected duration of
unemployment.

Figure 3 shows the impact on reemployment probabilities.
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The

figure shows the conditional reemployment probabilities (or hazard
functions) that the model predicts for each of the four groups.

Not

surprisingly, these hazard functions have shapes that are similar to the
predicted search effort functions in Figure 2.

The main difference is that

the increase in search effort of bonus-offered workers reduces the
reemployment probabilities faced by workers not offered the bonus (i.e., the
"with bonus" lines are below the "without bonus" lines in weeks 12-13 and
higher).

This result occurs for reasons that we have explored in depth

elsewhere (Davidson and Woodbury 1990).

III.

Discussion and Summary

Table 9 summarizes both the empirical and theoretical results from
sections I and II.

The estimates are in general agreement that workers who

were eligible for 38 weeks of UI benefits (FSC-eligibles) experienced a
reduction of unemployment (either insured unemployment or expected duration
of actual unemployment) on the order of 1.75 weeks as a result of the
Illinois Claimant Bonus.

The errors surrounding these estimates suggest a

substantial range around this point estimate, so that there is at least one
chance in six that the bonus impact was as great as 2.2 weeks, and an equal
probability that the impact was as small as 1.3 weeks.
The estimates also agree that the bonus impact on workers who were
eligible for 26 weeks of UI benefits (FSC-ineligibles) was on the order of
0.75 weeks.

The errors surrounding these estimates are large enough to

suggest that the impact of the Claimant Bonus on these workers, although
probably non-zero, could have been very small.
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The difference between the bonus impacts under 38 and 26 weeks of
benefit entitlement can be seen in Table 9, column 3.

The point estimates

are consistent in showing that the bonus effect for FSC-eligibles exceeded
that for FSC-ineligibles by close to 1 week.

The differences in bonus

impacts on insured unemployment (1.066 and 1.008 weeks) have p-values of 5
percent (are statistically significantly different from zero using a 5percent confidence test).

However, the differences in bonus impacts on

expected duration of unemployment (0.879 and 0.885) have p-values of about
15, suggesting that there is roughly 1 chance in 7 that these differences
occurred by chance.

Although not overwhelming, the evidence seems fairly

convincing that the impact of the Illinois Claimant Bonus^was greater for
FSC-eligibles--that is, those who were eligible for an additional 12 weeks
of benefits.
The bonus impacts predicted by the search/matching model (section II)
accord remarkable well with the empirical findings, as can also be seen in
Table 9.

The range of predicted bonus impacts for FSC-eligible workers--a

reduction of between 1.08 and 1.43 weeks in the duration of unemployment--is
slightly below our empirical point estimates of the bonus impact.

But that

entire range (1.08-1.43) falls within the 5-percent confidence interval
around any of the four point estimates of the bonus impact on FSC-eligibles.
Also, those confidence intervals do not overlap any part of the range of
predictions of the FSC-i.neligible bonus impact (0.29-0.43).
Similarly, the range of predicted bonus impacts for FSC-ineligible
workers--a reduction of between 0.29 and 0.43 weeks--is below our empirical
point estimates for FSC-ineligibles.

But again the entire range (0.29-0.43)

falls within the 5-percent confidence interval around any of the four point
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estimates of the FSC-ineligible bonus impact.

(These confidence intervals

do, however, partly overlap the range of predictions of the bonus impact on
FSC-eligibles (1.08-1.43)).
Finally, column 3 of Table 9 shows that the model predicts a bonus
impact on FSC-eligibles that is 0.79 to 1.00 week greater than the bonus
impact on FSC-ineligibles.

This range corresponds closely to the range of

empirical point estimates shown above it in column (3).
In summary, Table 9 suggests that the model developed in section II
offers predictions that are qualitatively correct and correspond
quantitatively to the observed impacts of the Claimant Bonus on FSCeligibles and -ineligibles.
The main conclusion to be drawn from these findings is that the
striking impact of the Illinois Claimant Bonus experiment reported in
Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987) is the combination of a whopping bonus effect
on FSC-eligibles and a rather unremarkable effect on FSC-jLneligibles.

That

is, the overall bonus impact of 1.15 weeks (Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987,
Table 4), is a weighted average of large impacts on workers who were
eligible for 36 weeks of UI benefits and small impacts on workers who were
eligible for 26 weeks of benefits.

These findings are consistent with the

search/matching model that we have tailored to the Illinois setting.

That

model predicts a rather small bonus impact for workers eligible for 26 weeks
of benefits, but predicts a far greater effect for workers eligible for 38
weeks of benefits.
Why was the effect of the Claimant Bonus experiment so much larger for
FSC-eligible workers than for workers eligible for only 26 weeks of UI
benefits?

The answer provided by the search/matching model is that FSC-
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eligible workers increased their search efforts disproportionately relative
to FSC-ineligibles.

The logic behind this is twofold.

First, FSC-eligibles

are predicted to have lower search intensities than are FSC-ineligibles
because they are eligible for more weeks of benefits.

Second, the increase

in search effort that results from the bonus offer has a similar absolute
magnitude for both FSC-eligibles and -ineligibles.

It follows that the

bonus induces a greater relative increase in the search effort of FSCeligibles , and hence a greater reduction in both insured unemployment and
the expected duration of actual unemployment.
The results reported here, along with those reported for the Washington
Reemployment Bonus by Spiegelman, O'Leary, and Kline (1990), suggest that
the reemployment bonus may be a less promising policy during normal economic
times in the U.S. than was earlier thought.

Nevertheless, the new results

reported above on the Illinois Bonus suggest a possible role for the
reemployment bonus during a downturn in the U.S.--that is, in conjunction
with extended benefits.

Moreover, the new results suggest a possible role

for the reemployment bonus in Canada and Western European countries, where
workers typically are entitled to 1 year of UI benefits, rather than just
six months as is standard in the U.S.
The search/matching model developed here, perhaps with some further
refinements, could be useful in designing an optimal bonus program in any of
these settings.

It would be useful to subject the model to further

statistical testing--particularly tests of the reemployment hazard
predictions of the model.

But the results presented above seem promising,

and suggest that this model (or some variant of it) could be an important
part of engineering an effective bonus program and perhaps a more efficient
UI system.
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FOOTNOTES

1.
Eligibility for FSC was determined when a worker filed the initial
claim for UI benefits. Once eligible, the worker could receive an
additional 12 weeks of benefits, and could continue to receive FSC benefits
even after new claimants were being denied FSC benefits because of the
program's expiration.
2.
The exclusion results in deletion of 246 controls and 260 experimentals
from the sample.
3.
The reemployment indicator is based on both quarterly earnings records
that are matched to each worker's benefit record, and a special rehire
indicator constructed by the Illinois Department of Employment Security. We
have experimented with various methods of combining these two data to get a
single estimate of the time of reemployment, and find that the results are
robust to the variations.

4.
We lose some information by using discrete two-week time periods. Any
worker who received an even number of weeks of UI benefits (including zero)
and gained reemployment in the following week is counted as gaining
reemployment one week too late. The importance of this information loss is
lessened by the fact that, as Harris (1987) discovered, only about half as
many workers in Illinois receive an even number of weeks of benefits as
receive odd number of weeks, mainly because of the system of certifying for
two weeks of benefits at a time. We believe that the increased simplicity
in estimation and modelling (see section II) that results from using twoweek periods outweighs the information loss that may result.
5.
It is also possible that these workers left Illinois, in which case we
cannot be sure of their labor force status. In either case, treating these
cases as incomplete or censored spells of joblessness is appropriate.
6.
The expected durations in Tables 4, 5, and 7 are obtained by equations
(2.18) and (2.19) in section II. Standard errors associated with each
expected duration are estimated by a Taylor approximation that makes use of
the variances of the hazards. We assume that workers who have exhausted
benefits have a constant reemployment hazard equal to n^ (the hazard in the
period following benefit exhaustion) in perpetuity; for example, n^ = 0.3816
for FSC-eligible controls (Table 4).
7.
See Lancaster and Nickell (1980), Ham and Rea (1987), and Lancaster
(1990) for details.
8.
That is, we transform the data in which the claimant is the unit of
observation in to a data set in which each claimant contributes Ti
observations, where TA is the number of two-week time periods in which
claimant i is observed in our data. The dependent variable in the probit is
zero for each period in which the claimant remained unemployed, and 1 in the
period in which the claimant became reemployed. (For censored spells-spells in which we never observe reemployment--the dependent variable is
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zero for all claimant-time periods in which a claimant is observed.)
the exposition in Allison (1984).

See

Since these are probit coefficients, a rough idea of the derivative of
9.
the reemployment probability with respect to an independent variable can be
obtained by multiplying each coefficient by 0.10, which is the approximate
value of the standard normal density associated with the mean reemployment
probabilities in these samples (which range from 0.048 to 0.059).
10. This model is patterned after the "trade frictions" models developed by
Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1984), among others. In
such models, the number of contacts between workers and firms is determined
by search effort, a matching (or search) technology, and by equilibrium
conditions that state that in steady-state the rate of job creation must
equal the rate at which jobs break-up. Wage rates are determined through
negotiations once a job contact has been made. In almost all such models,
job offers are never rejected (see Diamond and Maskin (1979) for a notable
exception) . The trade frictions approach contrasts with the search approach
more frequently used in labor economics, in which unemployed workers receive
job offers that they are free to accept to reject. The offers arrive
randomly at an average rate, A, and the wage offers come ~~from a stationary
cumulative distribution function, F(w) . Both A and F(w) are exogenous, so
that no attempt is made to model the firm's side of the labor market or to
characterize the full labor market equilibrium. Since only labor supply is
modelled, such models are commonly referred to as "partial-partial." In the
partial-partial model, unemployment is tied to the rate of job rejection,
whereas in the trade frictions approach, unemployment is determined by
search effort and the matching technology.
Our main reasons for choosing the trade frictions approach are the
relative ease with which institutional details of the UI system can be
incorporated into it, and the relative ease with which it can be tested
empirically. (Atkinson and others (1984) and Atkinson and Micklewright
(1990) have developed these and other criticisms of the partial-partial
approach.) Regarding the latter point, difficulties posed by partialpartial models (for our purposes) include the severe demands they make on
our'knowledge of the labor market (for example, knowledge of the wage-offer
distribution F(w)) and the sensitivity of their quantitative predictions to
underlying parameters and the wage-offer distribution. (See Marshall and
Zarkin (1987) for a discussion of the importance of distinguishing the
unobservable wage-offer distribution from the observable wage distribution.)
Although in the trade frictions approach, different assumptions about
underlying parameters (both observable and unobservable) generate different
quantitative predictions, we show below that it is possible to estimate the
underlying unobservable parameters, and find that the model's implications
are quite insensitive to variations in those parameters.
Equivalently, we could assume that each firm consists of several job
11.
opportunities but recruits for and fills each job separately.
We assume throughout that the separation rate (a) is not affected by
12.
the Claimant Bonus program so that it may treated as exogenous.
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13.
In Davidson and Woodbury (1990) we allow the firm and worker to
bargain over the wage so that earnings are determined endogenously. This is
accomplished by introducing value functions for the firm similar to the
functions used to describe worker income in section II.A.3 below. We then
use the Nash Cooperative Bargaining Solution which dictates that the wage be
set such that the firm and worker split the rents created by the job evenly.
For all relevant parameters, we show that the program has only a very small
impact on wages. This result is consistent with the experimental findings
in Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987). Therefore, treating w as exogenous is a
costless way to simplify the analysis.
14.
This is equivalent to assuming that all job contacts are made by
workers and that the underlying matching technology is quadratic (Diamond
and Maskin 1979).
15.
If p < 1 then p represents a contact probability. If p > 1 then we
interpret p as the number of firms contacted by the worker per period. For
example, if p = 1.5 then we assume that the worker contacts one firm with
probability 1 and a second firm with probability .5. We ignore the
possibility that any given worker may contact the same firm twice in any
given period.
16.
In maximizing Vt over pt we treat A as a parameter. The rationale
is that since each worker is small relative to the market, each individual
can ignore his/her own effect on A.

34

References
Allison, Paul D. Event History Analysis.
Publications, 1984.

Beverly Hills:

Sage

Atkinson, A.B., J. Gomulka, J. Micklewright, and N. Rau. "Unemployment
Benefit, Duration, and Incentives in Britain: How Robust Is the
Evidence?" Journal of Public Economics 23 (1984): 3-26.
Atkinson, Anthony B. and John Micklewright. "Unemployment Compensation and
Labour Market Transitions: A Critical Review." EUI Working Paper ECO
No. 90/9, European University Institute, Florence, May 1990.
Clark, Kim B. and Lawrence H. Summers. "Unemployment Insurance and Labor
Market Transitions." In Workers. Jobs, and Inflation, edited by Martin
Neil Baily. Washington, B.C.: Brookings, 1982. Pp. 279-318.
Corson, Walter, Paul T. Decker, Shari Miller Dunstan, and Anne R. Gordon.
The New Jersey Unemployment Insurance Reemployment Demonstration
Project: Final Evaluation Report. Unemployment Insurance Occasional
Paper 89-3, Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of
Labor, 1989.
Corson, Walter, Jean Grossman, and Walter Nicholson. .An Evaluation of the
Federal Supplemental Compensation Program. Unemployment Insurance
Service Occasional Paper 86-3, Employment and Training Administration,
U.S. Department of Labor, 1986.
Cox, David R. "Regression Models and Life-Tables." Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society, series B, 34 (1972): 187-202.
Davidson, Carl and Stephen A. Woodbury. "The Displacement Effects of
Reemployment Bonus Programs." Manuscript, Michigan State University
(Department of Economics) and W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research, July 1990.

Diamond, Peter A. "Wage Determination and Efficiency in Search
Equilibrium." Review of Economic Studies 49 (1982): 217-228.
Diamond, Peter A. and Eric Maskin. "An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and
Breach of Contract, I: Steady States." Bell Journal of Economics 10
(Spring 1979): 282-316.
Ehrenberg, Ronald G. "The Demographic Structure of Unemployment Rates and
Labor Market Transition Probabilities." Research in Labor Economics 3
(1980): 214-291.
Ehrenberg, Ronald G. and Ronald L. Oaxaca. "Unemployment Insurance,
Duration of Unemployment, and Subsequent Wage Gain." American Economic
Review 66 (December 1976): 754-766.

35

Ham, John C. and Samuel A. Rea, Jr. "Unemployment Insurance and Male
Unemployment Duration in Canada." Journal of Labor Economics 5 (July
1987): 325-253.
Harris, Peter H.
"The Duration of Benefit Spells and its Relationship to
the Weeks of Benefits Remaining in the Benefit Year." Manuscript,
Northwestern University, May 1987.
Holen, Arlene.
"Effects of Unemployment Insurance Entitlement on Duration
and Job Search Outcome." Industrial and Labor Relations Review 30
(July 1977): 445-450.
Lancaster, Tony. The Econometric Analysis of Transition Data.
Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Cambridge:

Lancaster, Tony and Stephen Nickell. "The Analysis of Reemployment
Probabilities for the Unemployed." Journal of the Royal Statistical
Society: Series A 143 (1980): 141-165.
Levine, Philip.
"Analysis of the Illinois Unemployment Insurance
Experiment: A Case Against Leisure-Induced Unemployment." Second Year
Paper, Department of Economics, Princeton University, April 1988.

Levine, Philip. "Testing Search Theory with Reemployment Bonus Experiments:
Cross-Validation of Results from New Jersey and Illinois." Working
Paper #257, Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University, October
1989.
Marshall, Robert C. and Gary A. Zarkin. "The Effect of Job Tenure on Wage
Offers." Journal of Labor Economics 5 (July 1987): 301-324.
Meyer, Bruce D. Implications of the Illinois Reemployment Bonus Experiments
for Theories of Unemployment and Policy Design." Working Paper No.
2783, National Bureau of Economic Research, December 1988.
Mortensen, Dale.
"Property Rights and Efficiency in Mating, Racing, and
Related Games." American Economic Review 72 (1982): 968-979.
Murphy, Kevin M. and Robert H. Topel. "The Evolution of Unemployment in the
United States: 1968-1985." NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1987. edited by
Stanley Fischer. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987. Pp. 11-58.
Nickell, Stephen.
"Estimating the Probability of Leaving Unemployment."
Econometrica 47 (September 1979): 1249-1266.
Pissarides, Christopher. "Efficient Job Rejection."
(Supplement 1984): 97-108.

Economic Journal 94

Spiegelman, Robert G., Christopher J. O'Leary, and Kenneth J. Kline.
"Results of the Washington Reemployment Bonus: Preliminary Findings."
Paper prepared for the APPAM Twelfth Annual Research Conference, San
Francisco, CA, October 18-20, 1990.
36

Steinberg, Danny and Frank A. Monforte. "Estimating the Effects of Job
Search Assistance and Training Programs on the Unemployment Durations
of Displaced Workers." In Unemployment and the Structure of Labor
Markets. edited by Kevin Lang and Jonathan S. Leonard. New York:
Basil Blackwell, 1987. Pp. 186-206.
Woodbury, Stephen A. and Robert G. Spiegelman. "Bonuses to Workers and
Employers to Reduce Unemployment: Randomized Trials in Illinois."
American Economic Review 77 (September 1987): 513-530.

37

Table 1
Illinois Claimant Bonus Experiment:

Participation and Use,

by Entitlement to UI Benefits

Panel A:

FSC-eligibles (38 weeks of benefit entitlement)

o

Claimant
____Control____
Experiment
N____Proportion__________N____Proportion
Eligible for the
experiments

2106

1.00

2337

1.00

Agreed to
participate

--

--

1960

0.84

Submitted
notice of hirec

--

--

468

0.20

Bonus paid

--

--

368

0.16

Panel B:

FSC-ineligibles (26 weeks of benefit entitlement)^
Claimant
____Control____
___Experiment
N____Proportion__________N____Proportion

Eligible for the
'experiments

1600

1.00

1589

1.00

Agreed to
participate

--

--

1346

0.85

Submitted
notice of hire c

--

--

239

0.15

Bonus paid

--

--

183

0.12

Proportion eligible
for FSC

0.568

0.595

Notes: a. Eligible for a total of 38 weeks of Unemployment Insurance
benefits--26 weeks of state-regular UI benefits plus 12 weeks of Federal
Supplemental Compensation (FSC).

Table 1
(continued)

b. Eligible for UI benefits, met the age and initial claim restriction of
the experiments, and were located in the administrative records of the
Illinois Department of Employment Security.
c. Includes participants who ultimately received a bonus but did not submit
a notice of hire when they gained reemployment within 11 weeks of filing
their UI claim.
d. Eligible for only 26 weeks of state-regular UI benefits. Only workers
with an earnings history sufficient to make them eligible for FSC, if they
had filed for UI benefits before FSC expired, are included in this sample.

Table 2
Characteristics of Claimants Assigned to Experimental Group,
by Entitlement to UI Benefits

Mean or Proportion
(standard error)
FSC-elieibles
FSC-inelieibles
Claimant
Claimant
Control
Experiment
Control
Experiment
33.28 e
(0.193)

33.15
(0.183)

32.68 e
(0.223)

32.82
(0.222)

Women (prop.)

0.463
(0.011)

0.458
(0.010)

0.459 d
(0.012)

0.422 d
(0.012)

Men (prop.)

0.537
(0.011)

0.542
(0.010)

0.541d

0.578d

(0.012)

(0.012)

White (prop.)

0.623d
(0.011)

0.653 d
(0.010)

0.654
(0.012)

0.665
(0.011)

Black (prop.)

0.278
(0.010)

0.254
(0.009)

0.253
(0.011)

0.235
(0.011)

Hispanic, Native
American, other (prop.)

0.098
(0.006)

0.093
(0.006)

0.094
(0.007)

0.101
(0.008)

Number of employers
in base period

1.430
(0.016)

1.469
(0.016)

1.473
(0.019)

1.438
(0.018)

Base period earnings 3

13,473
(193)

13,287
(191)

13,009
(232)

13,576
(250)

Number of ES referrals 13

0.212
(0.015)

0.218
(0.017)

0.176
(0.015)

0.156
(0.013)

Dependents' allowance
(prop.)

0.468
(0.011)

0.466
(0.010)

0.458
(0.012)

0.470
(0.013)

Weekly benefit amount'

122.7
(0.860)

121.3
(0.818)

0.616
(0.011)

0.590
(0.010)

(0.012)

0.529 d
(0.013)

0.368
(0.011)

0.378
(0.010)

0.395
(0.012)

0.418
(0.012)

2106

2337

Age

Chicago area (prop.)

Outstate Illinois (prop.)

N

121.6
(1.01)
0.586 d

1600

120.6
(1.01)

1589

Table 2
(continued)

Notes: a. The base period is the first four of the five completed quarters
before filing for UI benefits.
b. Number of referrals received from the Employment Service office where
the claimant registered.
c.

The weekly benefit amount excludes any dependents' allowance received.

d. Rejection of the hypothesis that the difference of means or proportions
between the control and experimental groups is zero using a two-tailed 5percent significance test.
e. Rejection of the hypothesis that the difference of means or proportions
between FSC-eligible controls and FSC-ineligible controls is zero using a
two-tailed 5-percent significance test.

Table 3
Means and Differences of Means of Program Variables
by Experimental Group and Entitlement to UI Benefits

(1)

Control
(std.
error)

FSC-elieibles
(3)
(2)
Control
minus
Claimant
Experiment
Claimant
Difference
Experiment
of means
(std.
(std. error)
error)

(4)

Control
(std.
error)

FSC-inelieibles
(6)
(5)
Control
minus
Claimant
Claimant
Experiment
Experiment Difference
of means
(std.
(std. error)
error)

Benefits paid ($)
1) State regular,
first spell

2303
(39.3)

2065
(35.9)

238. la
(53.2)

2)Total,
first spell

2843
(53.8)

2511
(48.5)

332. Oa
(72.2)

3) State regular,
benefit year

2539
(38.3)

2317
(35.7)

222. 8 a
(52.3)

4)Total,
benefit year

3093
(52.1)

2778
(47.6)

315. 7 a
(70.5)

2325
(42.0)
--

2162
(42.7)
--

162. 9 a
(59.9)
--

2510
(40.9)

2417
(42.1)

93.6
(58.7)

Weeks of insured unemployment :
5)First spell

19.8
(0.318)

17.9
(0.299)

1.90a
(0.437)

16.8
(0.247)

15.7
(0.259)

1.102 3
(0.358)

6)Benefit year

21.6
(0.299)

19.8
(0.286)

1.78 a
(0.414)

18.3
(0.233)

17.6
(0.246)

0.714b
(0.338)

Diff. of
Proportion Proportion Proportions
(std.
(std.
(std.
error)
error)
error)

Diff. of
Proportion Proportion Proportions
(std.
(std.
(std.
error)
error)
error)

Proportion of claimants who:
0.489
(0.011)

0.436
(0.010)

0.053 3
(0.015)

0.447
(0.012)

0.432
(0.012)

0.015
(0.018)

0.376
8)Ended benefits
within 11 weeks (0.010)

0.436
(0.010)

-0.060 3
(0.015)

0.319
(0.012)

0.374
(0.012)

-0.055 3
(0.017)

7) Exhausted
benefits

2106

2337

1600

1589

Table 3
(continued)

Notes:
"First spell" refers to the spell of unemployment immediately following the
initial claim for UI.
"Total benefits paid" refers to the sum of state regular benefits
and Federal Supplemental Compensation.
"Benefit year" refers to benefits paid or weeks
of benefits paid during the full benefit year for each claimant.
"Ended benefits within
11 weeks" refers to termination of benefits within 11 weeks of filing the initial claim
(equivalently, 10 or fewer weeks of benefit payments, because of the 1-week waiting
period). Samples are the same as those underlying Table 2.
a.

Rejection of the hypothesis that the difference of means is zero using a two-tailed
1-percent significance level.

b.

Rejection of the hypothesis that the difference of means is zero using a two-tailed
5-percent significance level.

Table 4
Unadjusted Conditional Reemployment Probabilities (Discrete Hazards),
FSC-eligibles (38 Weeks of Benefit Entitlement)
Weeks since
initial claim
0-1

Control
Risk set
Hazard
-2106

Claimant Experiment
Risk aet
Hazard
2337

2-3

2106

0.0912

2337

0.1078

4-5

1910

0.0602

2081

0.0788 3

6-7

1783

0.0466

1906

0 . 0446

8-9

1687

0.0462

1796

0.0635 a

10-11

1594

0 . 0445

1664

0.0535

12-13

1508

0.0345

1555

0.0502 a

14-15

1445

0.0291

1457

0.0329

16-17

1384

0.0275

1389

0.0295

18-19

1333

0.0315

1333

0.0278

20-21

1265

0.0269

1279

0.0250

22-23

1214

0.0264

1222

0.0270

24-25

1165

0.0309

1172

0.0333

26-27

1105

0 . 0443

1115

0.0413

28-29

1042

0.1008

1033

0.1026

30-31

738

0.0203

706

0.0283

32-33

706

0.0255

668

0.0329

34-35

670

0.0239

625

0.0256

36-37

644

0.0295

601

0.0416

38-39

605

0.0430

557

0.0233

40+

553

0.3816

527

0.3738

Implied expected
duration of unemployment
(std. error)

25. 85 weeks
(0 .321)

24. 09 weeks
(0 .312)

Notes: The risk set is the number of workers unemployed at the start of
each two-week period. The hazard is the proportion of the risk set who
gained reemployment during the period. Note that the risk set in each
successive period does not equal the risk set in the previous period minus
the number of workers who found reemployment, because of censoring. On
computation of implied expected durations of unemployment and associated
standard errors, see footnote 4.
Superscript a denotes rejection of the hypothesis that the difference
between control and experimental hazards is zero, using a two-tailed 5percent significance test.

Table 5
Unadjusted Conditional Reemployment Probabilities (Discrete Hazards),
FSC Ineligibles (26 Weeks of Benefit Entitlement)
Weeks since
initial claim
0-1

Control
Hazard
Risk set
-1600

Claimant Experiment
Risk set
Hazard
1589

2-3

1600

0.0688

1589

0.09943

4-5

1488

0.0477

1430

0.0427

6-7

1405

0.0349

1360

0.0507 3

8-9

1348

0.0423

1280

0.0398

10-11

1278

0.0376

1221

0.0426

12-13

1217

0.0394

1147

0.0349

14-15

1160

0.0474

1097

0.0483

16-17

1086

0.0359

1025

0.0380

18-19

1028

0.0418

974

0.0380

20-21

968

0.0382

919

0.0370

22-23

923

0.0563

869

0.0368 a

24-25

862

0.0360

821

0.0487

26-27

807

0.0682

765

0.0549

28+

731

0.3926

699

0.4134

Implied expected
duration of unemployment
(std. error)

22. 42 weeks
(0 .267)

21. 55 weeks
(0 .287)

Notes: The risk set is the number of workers unemployed at the start
of each two-week period. The hazard is the proportion of the risk set
who gained reemployment during the period. Note that the risk set in
each successive period does not equal the risk set in the previous
period minus the number of workers who found reemployment, because of
censoring. On computation of implied expected durations of
unemployment and associated standard errors, see footnote 4.
Superscript a denotes rejection of the hypothesis that the
difference between control and experimental hazards is zero, using a
two-tailed 5-percent significance test.

Table 6
Models of Insured Unemployment Duration and Reemployment Hazard
(Estimated coefficients with standard errors in parentheses)

Explanatory
Variable

(2)
(1)
Insured Unemployment
Duration COLS)
FSCFSCeligibles ineligibles

(6)
(5)
(4)
Discrete reemployment
________Hazard (Maximum Likelihood)_________
FSC-ineligibles
____FSC-eligibles____
Controls Experimentals Controls Experimentals
(3)

-3.380
(0.400)

-3.374
(0.370)

-3.055
(0.466)

-3.507
(0.439)

0.103
(0.350)

0.004
(0.030)

-0.025
(0.028)

0.000
(0.034)

0.014
(0.036)

3.263
(0.592)

0.723
(0.467)

-0.114
(0.042)

-0.130
(0.040)

-0.074
(0.046)

-0.105
(0.048)

35-44

4.107
(0.680)

1.786
(0.541)

-0.147
(0.048)

-0.185
(0.045)

-0.140
(0.054)

-0.189
(0.056)

45-54

4.814
(0.743)

2.855
(0.618)

-0.225
(0.053)

-0.268
(0.051)

-0.293
(0.064)

-0.273
(0.065)

Black

5.248
(0.522)

3.408
(0.441)

-0.233
(0.037)

-0.292
(0.036)

-0.222
(0.046)

-0.336
(0.047)

Hispanic

4.324
(0.809)

0.165
(0.687)

-0.165
(0.057)

-0.261
(0.057)

-0.011
(0.070)

-0.171
(0.072)

Native American

6.089
(2.641)

0.952
(1.678)

-0.226
(0.232)

-0.238
(0.152)

0.051
(0.189)

-0.211
(0.161)

Other race

-2.459
(1.673)

1.507
(1.332)

0.069
(0.120)

0.034
(0.111)

-0.039
(0.140)

-0.476
(0.155)

Constant

14.629
(1.622)

15.359
(1.317)

Claimant
Experiment

-1.679
(0.400)

-0.671
(0.333)

-0.177
(0.420)

25-34

Gender:
Female
Male
Age:
20-24

Ethnicity:
White

Table 6
(continued)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

-1.315
(0.279)

-0.541
(0.231)

0.096
(0.020)

-0.040
(0.018)

0.020
(0.023)

0.057
(0.024)

< $6,000

1.957
(1.233)

3.375
(1.008)

-0.055
(0.088)

-0.124
(0.081)

-0.384
(0.108)

-0.190
(0.095)

$6,000-$18,000

3.215
(1.012)

3.156
(0.834)

-0.181
(0.717)

-0.116
(0.066)

-0.330
(0.090)

-0.212
(0.076)

$18,000-$30,000

0.739
(1.035)

1.635
(0.850)

-0.099
(0.072)

0.041
(0.068)

-0.239
(0.091)

-0.079
(0.078)

--

--

--

--

--

--

Number of
employers in
base period
Base period
earnings :

> $30,000
Number of
referrals

-0.179
(0,267)

0.064
(0.299)

0.022
(0.021)

0.007
(0.016)

-0.006
(0.029)

0.008
(0.035)

Dependents '
allowance
received

2.143
(0.426)

1.213
(0.351)

-0.148
(0.030)

-0.102
(0.028)

-0.136
(0.036)

-0.068
(0.036)

--

--

--

Weekly benefit
amount :
< $51

.'

$51 - $120

1.230
(0.945)

-0.797
(0.728)

-0.094
(0.068)

0.034
(0.066)

-0.041
(0.074)

0.160
(0.078)

> $120

1.883
(1.094)

-0.704
(0.870)

-0.035
(0.079)

-0.006
(0.075)

-0.013
(0.089)

0.148
(0.093)

Low UE,
high growth

-0.497
(0.636)

-1.508
(0.617)

0.060
(0.043)

0.010
(0.043)

0.255
(0.061)

0.026
(0.060)

Low UE,
stable growth

-1.043
(0.866)

-1.526
(0.669)

-0.005
(0.061)

0.051
(0.059)

0.220
(0.066)

0.058
(0.071)

Labor market:

Chicago (average
UE, average growth)

Table 6
(continued)
(5)

(6)

-0.146
(0.070)

0.030
(0.067)

-0.053
(0.083)

-0.094
(0.056)

-0.265
(0.053)

-0.133
(0.056)

-0.207
(0.055)

-0.131
(0.074)

-0.155
(0.061)

-0.280
(0.116)

-0.002
(0.072)

Fall

-0.064
(0.093)

-0.134
(0.094)

-0.201
(0.131)

-0.038
(0.135)

Winter

-0.153
(0.076)

-0.018
(0.076)

-0.162
(0.097)

-0.101
(0.102)

Spring

-0.130
(0.096)

-0.065
(0.097)

--

--

Included

Included

Included

Included

(1)

(2)

(3)

Average UE,
high Growth

1.393
(1.036)

0.389
(0.736)

-0.029
(0.073)

High UE,
some growth

2.350
(0.757)

1.403
(0.529)

High UE,
little growth

2.103
(0.946)

0.126
(0.829)

Season:

Summer
Time-since- initialclaim dummies
R-squared (adj)

0.076

0.051

Loglikelihood x(-2)
Sample size "
Number of
censored
spells
Number of
claimant periods

4,443

3,189

1,219

1,291

1,122

1,186

2,106

2,337

1,600

1,589

887

880

618

592

26,563

27,360

17,501

16,785

Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the number of weeks of insured
unemployment experienced during the benefit year. The mean of the dependent variable is
21.7 weeks in column (1) and 18.9 weeks in column (2). Columns (3) through (6) are
probit estimates of the conditional probability of reemployment in period t. The unit of
observation is the claimant-certification period. Mean conditional reemployment
probabilities: 0.048 (column (3)), 0.053 (column (4)), 0.056 (column (5)), 0.059 (column
(6)).

Table 7
Adjusted Conditional Reemployment Probabilities (Discrete Hazards)
Weeks since
initial claim
0-1

FSC-eligibles
Control
Experimental

FSC-ineligibles
Experimental
Control
--

2-3

0.0870

0.1034

0.0650

0.0951

4-5

0.0565

0.0746

0.0443

0.0398

6-7

0.0434

0.0414

0.0323

0.0474

8-9

0.0434

0.0599

0.0393

0.0369

10-11

0.0420

0.0507

0.0342

0.0400

12-13

0.0319

0.0467

0.0369

0.0327

14-15

0.0267

0.0304

0.0438

0 . 0442

16-17

0.0257

0.0274

0.0332

0.0347

18-19

0.0289

0.0255

0.0387

0.0346

20-21

0.0244

0.0232

0.0355

0.0340

22-23

0.0243

0.0247

0.0517

0.0330

24-25

0.0285

0.0305

0.0339

0.0458

26-27

0.0416

0.0383

0.0651

0.0516

28-29 (28+)

0.0971

0.0984

0.3912

0.4118

30-31

0.0181

0.0260

32-33

0.0230

0.0302

34-35

0.0219

0.0231

36-37

0.0283

0.0385

38-39

0.0407

0.0209

40+

0.3799

0.3730

Implied expected 25.86
duration of
(0.322)
unemployment
(std. error)

24.10
(0.319)

22.43
(0.261)

21.56
(0.281)

Notes: Discrete hazards computed from the estimated reeinployment
probability models reported in Table 6, columns (3) through (6), by
substituting mean characteristics of each duration cohort of workers into
the appropriate model and solving for the expected probability of
reemployment. On computation of implied expected durations of
unemployment and associated standard errors, see footnote 4.

Table 8
Predicted Impact of the Illinois Claimant Bonus on
Expected Duration of Unemployment, by Entitlement to UI Benefits

Reduction in expected duration of unemployment (Ad)
FSC-eligibles
FSC-ineligibles
(38 weeks of
(26 weeks of
benefit entitlement)
benefit entitlement)

0.002
a - 0.006
a = 0.010
a = 0.014

1.08
1.14
1.19

0.29
0.32
0.35

1.15
1.20
1.25

0.31
0.34
0.38

1.27
1.33
1.43

0.37
0.40
0.43

r = 0.008
a = 0.006
a = 0.010
a = 0.014

r - 0.020
a = 0.006
a = 0.010
a = 0.014

Notes: r = biweekly interest rate; o = separation rate. In the absence of
the bonus, the expected duration of unemployment is 25.86 weeks for FSCeligibles, and 22.43 weeks for FSC-ineligibles.

Table 9
Summary of Estimated and Predicted Effects of the Illinois Claimant Bonus
under Differing Benefit Entitlements

Estimate or
prediction (and source)

Reduction in weeks of unemployment
induced bv Claimant Bonus under:
(1)
(2)
FSC-eligibles
FSC-ineligibles
(38 weeks of
(26 weeks of
benefit entitlement)
benefit entitlement)

(3)
Difference

Unadjusted estimates:
Comparison of mean
weeks of insured
unemployment
(Table 3)

1.78
(0.414)

0.714
(0.338)

1.066
(0.534)

Expected duration of
unemployment implied
by unadjusted hazards
(Tables 4 and 5)

1.757
(0.447)

0.878
(0.392)

0.879
(0.617)

OLS, duration of insured
unemployment (Table 6,
columns 1 and 2)

1.68
(0.400)

0.671
(0.333)

1.008
(0.520)

Expected duration of
unemployment implied
by adjusted hazards
(Table 7)

1.763
(0.453)

0.878
(0.384)

0.885
(0.594)

0.29-0.43

0.79-1.00

Adjusted estimates:

Predictions from matching/search model:
From range of values of
a, r (Table 8)

1.08-1.43
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Figure 3
Predicted hazard functions
with and without Claimant Bonus
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